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THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE AT THE 
UNITED STATES BORDER WITH 
CYBERSPACE 
John Palfrey* 
ABSTRACT 
In the twenty-first century, a state can come to know more 
about each of its citizens via surveillance than ever before in 
human history.  Some states are beginning to exercise this 
ability.  Much of this additional surveillance ability derives from 
enhanced access to digital information.  This digital information 
comes in the form of bits of data that flow through both rivers 
and oceans of data.  These rivers are full of information that 
passes by a given point, or series of points, in a network and can 
be intercepted; these oceans are also stocked with information 
that can be searched after the fact.  These data are held in 
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private hands as well as public.  The most effective (or invasive, 
depending upon your vantage point) new forms of surveillance 
often involve a search of data held in a combination of private 
and public hands.  Both private and public entities are 
increasingly encouraged to retain more data as a result of legal 
and market pressures.  There are essentially no Fourth 
Amendment protections for U.S. citizens whose data is collected 
by a private third-party and turned over to the state.  Nor are 
there such constitutional protections for the re-use of privately 
collected data by state actors.  The few statutory provisions that 
protect citizens in these contexts are out-of-date and riddled with 
loop-holes.  This inquiry prompts hard questions about the need 
to redefine the public and the private in a digital age.  The 
meaning of the public and the private is changing, in material 
ways, both from the perspective of the observer and the observed.  
We need to rethink legal protections for citizens from state 
surveillance in a digital age as a result of this third-party data 
problem. 
 
I.  I NTRODUCTION 
Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an 
extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been 
prohibitively expensive. Whether and what kind of restrictions 
should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such 
surveillance when used in routine criminal enforcement are 
momentous issues that fortunately we need not try to resolve 
in this case.1 
So punted a court in a case related to the privacy 
implications of police use of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 
program.  This punting was with good reason in this particular 
case: the court did not need to reach this larger issue to resolve 
the matter before them.  Instead, the court simply wished to 
draw attention to the bigger problem on the horizon.  At some 
point, each state that cares about the privacy interests of its 
 
  1  United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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citizens will have to grapple with this hard question.  In the 
process, we will find that our received notions of what is public 
and what is private have changed in a digital age in ways that 
have profound implications for the future.2 
As a nation that continues to lead in the development of 
new technologies, we in the United States push information 
technology harder and further ahead with every passing year.  
Much of this innovation takes place in the private sector.  It is 
this innovation, in large measure, that makes surveillance of 
citizens far cheaper, just as the court said in United States v. 
Garcia.3  The benefits for economic growth and productivity are 
obvious; we accept this progress as a social good.  The long-term 
costs of this progress, in areas such as privacy, are less obvious. 
As consumers and as citizens, we repeatedly trade 
convenience for control, handing over growing amounts of 
information about ourselves to others in the process.  Our lives 
are increasingly mediated by digital technologies and described 
by data held in digital formats.  We are racing ahead quickly 
with the development of new technologies while the 
institutions—legal and otherwise—designed to protect user 
privacy have lagged behind.  The tradeoffs involved are rarely 
conscious ones. 
This growing problem has its roots in the fact that, as 
information technologies improve in efficiency and become more 
integrated in everyday life, fewer and fewer citizens are likely to 
know what information is being collected about them and by 
whom.  Much of this data collection is conducted not by state 
actors, but by private parties.  Citizens have even less of a sense 
of how these data are being used, or might be used and re-used 
in the future.  This issue is particularly acute in the context of 
 
  2 The United States is not alone in this respect.  “Privacy is a protean concept,” 
according to a Canadian Supreme Court opinion, R.V. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 434 
(Can.).  In his opinion, Justice Binnie implies that the decision-makers are avoiding hard 
questions.  The Tessling case parallels the landmark United States case, Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), in important respects, though the outcomes of the two 
matters diverge from one another. 
  3 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by 
enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively 
expensive.”). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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young people we have surveyed, who are leaving vast tracks 
behind them as they lead lives substantially mediated by digital 
technologies.4 
This lack of information is not just a matter of simple 
consumer ignorance or lack of attention on the part of citizens.  
Rather, the primary cause is that the technologies of 
surveillance in use at any moment, in this digital age, are 
unknowable even by experts.  We have no way of detecting many 
kinds of prevalent surveillance; those that we can detect are 
often hopelessly, unknowably complex.  Expert computer users 
are often fooled by whether the antivirus software they are 
running on their computer is capturing private information 
about them or not.5  Virtually no one knows what information is 
being kept by our Internet Service Provider or e-mail host or 
search engine, much less what the National Security Agency 
(NSA) is collecting through the computers it has installed on 
AT&T’s network.6  And for many working Americans, there is no 
realistic choice but to rely upon at least some private parties—
whether Google, Microsoft or Yahoo! for search, or AT&T, 
Verizon, or Comcast for data, and so forth—for digital 
communications services. 
The most important aspect of this story of surveillance—
and how little citizens know about it—is the change in the 
interaction between the public and the private.  A growing 
number of private firms are collecting a growing amount of data 
about individuals.  In effect, each individual has a growing 
“digital dossier,” in the words of Professor Daniel Solove, of 
information held about them in a distributed set of places.7  The 
 
  4 See J OHN  PALFREY  &  URS  GASSER, BORN  DIGITAL:  UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 17-82 (2008). 
  5 The author has seen this dynamic repeatedly in the context of a related research 
project, StopBadware.org, which provides forums for novices and experts to work 
together to understand how certain forms of online surveillance work.  See 
http://www.stopbadware.org/. 
  6 See Ryan Singel, Whistle-blower Outs NSA Spy Room, WIRED, Apr. 7, 2006, 
available at http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70619 (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2008). 
  7 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 2-7 (2004). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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rules for how and when the government can access and 
aggregate these data are few and unclear.  Likewise, there are 
no protections for the re-use of these data among law 
enforcement authorities once the information is collected, 
regardless, in fact, of the legality of the original mode of 
accessing the data.  The Fourth Amendment, as currently 
understood, reaches neither.8  While some statutes provide 
limited protection to citizens, these protections are spotty and 
cover only specific types of information.9  This fast-growing 
“third-party data problem” and its implications are the central 
concerns of this paper.10 
This paper builds upon our collective understanding of this 
emerging third-party data problem in the context of current 
surveillance and data retention practices.  The purpose of 
reviewing these practices in detail is to highlight some of their 
largest implications for the privacy of individuals.  I begin by 
describing the changes that advances in digital technologies are 
bringing about for the practice of state surveillance of citizens 
with the intention of setting those changes into the context of 
the conception of the public and the private.  The trend I 
underscore here is the greater interaction between the public 
sector (those in government who wish to learn more about 
certain citizens) and private actors who either collect 
information about citizens or who develop the technology to 
enable monitoring of citizen activity.  As a “surveillance-ready” 
network, the Internet permits surveillance of citizens in more 
ways than ever before in human history.  This surveillance can 
take place at the network, server, and client levels of the 
 
  8 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976). 
  9 See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1085-86 (2002). 
  10 Others have taken up aspects of this problem, too, from various perspectives.  See 
Solove, supra note 10; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: 
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. 
REV.  975  (2007); CHRISTOPHER  SLOBOGIN,  PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE  NEW  GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (Univ. of Chicago Press 2007); Jack M. 
Balkin,  The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN.  L.  REV. 
(forthcoming 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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Internet’s architecture.  At the same time, citizens are unlikely 
to be in a position to keep up with the changes in these 
technologies and the potential surveillance practices that they 
permit.  In the final section of the paper, I argue that the 
combination of these factors places increased pressure on the 
complex—some say unstable—legal doctrine of the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.” 
II.   T HE DIGITAL DIFFERENCE 
Digital technologies, including but not limited to the public 
Internet, make several crucial differences when it comes to 
surveillance.  One is the rate of change in technology 
development and usage practices—and the corresponding 
difficulty for individuals to keep up with these changes.11  A  
second is the scale on which activities occur and the potential 
area of impact of one’s actions.12  Together, these differences 
brought about by the rise of digital technologies place a great 
deal of pressure on courts’ interpretation of crucial legal 
doctrines, such as the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
The rate of change in technology developments, and 
associated usage patterns, is faster in many respects than it has 
been in the past.  The time is shortened between major changes 
in societies and markets; the speed of getting to market with a 
new technology service or product for an entrepreneur is often 
faster; the time that it takes for an idea or expression to reach 
many people can be much lower; and so forth.  Consider that it 
was centuries between the invention of the first moveable type in 
China and the printing date of Gutenberg’s first bibles, and yet 
further centuries before those bibles reached wide circulation.   
In contrast, digital technologies have reached over a billion 
 
  11 See generally JAMES GLEICK, FASTER 83-93 (1999). 
  12 This assertion may seem self-evident to some readers, but the Internet today 
reaches most parts of the globe and can be accessed at little or no cost in public places 
such as libraries and schools around the world.  The impact of an action that takes place 
in one place—say, New York in the United States—may have reverberations in a place 
distant in physical terms and in time. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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people within a few decades of their invention.13  The ability to 
do more with digital technologies is outstripping our ability to 
process what the social implications of these changes may be. 
The scale on which these activities take place, and on which 
they have an impact, is likewise greater than it has been in the 
past.  The reach and effect of actions in digital space, such as 
publication of data to a digital network, are greater and 
growing.  The potential impact of an idea can be greater; one can 
reach many more people by way of an audience than ever before; 
the scale of harm can be greater for a bad act; the scale of 
entrepreneurial innovations can become enormous very quickly; 
the amount and timing of capital is changing; and so forth. 
The broad effect of these two factors—vastly increased 
speed and scale in the development and reach of information 
technologies—is to make it hard to apply and make rules in this 
field.  These changes apply special pressure to existing legal 
doctrines, which begin to seem inadequate to new tasks of 
protecting individual privacy.  The more technology advances, 
and the more people use the technology to mediate more aspects 
of their lives, the less adequate existing legal protections for 
individual privacy appear.  The impact of these frequent and 
material changes should be to prompt frequent review of 
existing laws.  In other cases, the answer may be to establish 
creative, flexible institutions to address such problems without 
the traditional legislative involvement, to the extent that new 
effective laws cannot be enacted to solve the right problems.14 
Lawmakers and judges face a significant challenge in 
keeping up with this rate of change in information technologies.  
The implications of these shifts are many; those implications 
may be yet greater in a few short years if the rate of change 
continues.  I emphasize here the implications for the way that 
 
  13 See Robert Darnton, The Library in the New Age, THE  NEW  YORK  REVIEW OF 
BOOKS, Vol. 55, No. 10 (June 12, 2008) (for a general discussion of this transition in 
information technologies and the rate of change). 
  14 See, e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 
170-73, 195-99 (2008).  Consider the example of StopBadware.org, a neighborhood watch 
project on the Internet intended to protect consumers from malicious code through a 
partnership of private entities, which picks up where classic regulation has left off.  Id. 
at 170-73. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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we think of the public and the private in law broadly, with 
special application to the workings of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.15  There are yet more profound 
implications when one thinks of the implications at an 
international legal level, since the interplay between law 
enforcement agencies and private parties globally makes the 
puzzle vastly more complex.  And in many states, citizens have 
far less to protect them from state intrusion than the Fourth 
Amendment in the United States. 
In the context of surveillance and data retention, these two 
broad changes mean that, over time, more people can come to 
know more about what others are doing or have done.  The 
technology of the Internet and other digital networks is 
surveillance-ready, which is to say the technologies are designed 
in such a way that surveillance is simple to perform at multiple 
points in the network.  There are many “points of control,” as 
Professor Jonathan Zittrain has pointed out, at which a state 
may seek to block or to copy bits of information.16  These points 
of control include international gateways, Internet Exchange 
Points (IXPs), Internet Service Providers (ISPs), public access 
points (such as cybercafés, schools, or public libraries), corporate 
workplaces, technology service providers (such as blogging hosts, 
for instance), and other networks, like mobile and tracking 
devices such as GPS systems on vehicles or handheld devices.17 
 
  15 In this paper, I do not make a specific claim as to when a warrant should issue, 
nor do I cover the specifics of criminal procedure, such as Rule 41 of the United States 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP).  There has been much work done in terms 
of how these processes should work by other legal scholars.  See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, 
Search Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 MISS. L.J. 85-135 (2005) (“This article 
urges legislatures and rules committees to update the statutory rules that govern the 
warrant process in response to the new challenge of digital searches,” including specific 
proposals to update Rule 41 of the United States FRCP); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and 
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531-85 (2005); and Orin S. Kerr, Four 
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503-51 (2007). 
  16 See  Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003). 
  17 See, e.g., Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Fourth Amendment Protections, and 
Equivalent State Constitutional Protections, as Applied to the Use of GPS Technology, 
Transponder, or the Like, to Monitor Location and Movement of Motor Vehicle, Aircraft, 
or Watercraft, 5 A.L.R.6th 385 (2005). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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III. TYPES OF DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE: NETWORK, SERVER, AND 
CLIENT 
When one thinks of network surveillance, the image of a 
man wearing headphones (and perhaps chomping on cold pizza) 
in a van on a stakeout outside a crook’s apartment building may 
leap to mind.  It is true that one means of listening in on the 
conversations of a surveillance target is to seek to intercept 
information flows across the network, as in a river (and perhaps 
to copy or store it for later retrieval).  But in the digital age, this 
mode of “tapping” a line is only one of a wide range of types of 
surveillance available to a law enforcement official—and not 
necessarily the most efficient, given the architecture and the 
scale of the network.  The use of many more types of data, 
collected by many different types of actors, makes it much easier 
in some instances, to reconstruct a past act or to anticipate a 
future—lawful or unlawful—act. 
Given the proliferation of the means of surveillance on 
digital networks, it is extremely hard to provide a full picture, at 
any moment, of all possible means of surveillance of a target.  
Such a description is hard both on the micro level (of analyzing 
individual surveillance activities) and on the macro level (of 
setting these practices into the context of the larger technical, 
social, political, and legal issues in which they are nested). 
One reason for the difficulty at the micro level is that 
Internet surveillance is a “read-only” activity.  If surveillance is 
done well at the network or server level, it is impossible to 
detect through direct technical means.  We cannot detect the 
fact of surveillance, what data is being surveilled, or who is 
surveilling the data.  At the micro level, it is difficult to detect 
and verify the data, actors, and uses of the data involved in any 
well-planned digital surveillance activity.18 
 
  18 Most of the observations in this section of this paper are derived from an ongoing 
research project on Internet surveillance at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society 
at Harvard University, of which the author is principal investigator.  Key researchers 
include Christopher Soghoian, Hal Roberts, and Chris Conley.  Others have made 
similar observations; nothing in this section is groundbreaking in terms of computer 
science research.  See generally, David Lyon, Cyberspace, Surveillance, and Social 
Control: The Hidden Face of the Internet in Asia, in ASIA.COM: ASIA ENCOUNTERS THE 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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The simplest example of this sort of difficult-to-monitor 
surveillance is a monitoring box, placed with care in the closet of 
an Internet service provider.19  If that monitoring box is 
physically connected to the rest of the network with only read 
(not write) wires coming from the network, it is technologically 
incapable of writing anything back to the network.  Surveillance 
at the client level is always theoretically detectable, but most 
client-side surveillance tools are designed to avoid detection and 
can only be thwarted in this regard by sophisticated detection 
techniques.  This problem of detection limits what we can say 
definitively about a given surveillance activity at any given 
moment.  Since we cannot know the answer with perfect clarity, 
we have to look at that larger field of Internet surveillance as a 
whole to think about the potential data subject to surveillance. 
On the macro level, placing Internet surveillance into the 
larger technical, political, social, and legal landscapes leads to 
further questions.  The questions are large because of the 
stream of new information about Internet surveillance.  Within 
this stream of information, it is important to distinguish what 
represents a meaningfully new type of surveillance and what 
represents another example of an existing type.  There is a wide 
and growing array of potential surveillance tools.  A complete 
catalogue of these devices would not only be dreadfully boring to 
read, it would almost certainly be incomplete at any given 
moment in time since Internet-related surveillance is meant to 
be carried out undetected.  All of these various tools interact 
with each other in complex ways; for instance, the routers that 
 
INTERNET 67, 67-82 (Kong Chong Ho, Randy Kluver, Kenneth C.C. Yang eds., 2003); 
SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2000); LAWRENCE  LESSIG,  CODE  2.0, 200-232 (2006); DANIEL  SOLOVE,  THE  DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004). 
  19 The range of types of surveillance, by the government and private industry, has 
been described in many scholarly papers before this one.  For one overview, see Gattiker, 
U.E., Holsten, H. & Miller, J., 
User Attitudes Toward Possible Governmental and/or Organizational Surveillance, 
Monitoring 
and/or Eavesdropping on the Internet, EICAR 2000 Best Paper Proceedings, 126-157 
(2000),  available at   
http://eicar.weburb.dk/past_conferences/2000/papers/Monday/Security%20Trust%20and
%20E-commerce/other/Gattiker.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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control the network are clients themselves and so are open to 
the same sorts of questions we ask of other clients (and 
vulnerable to monitoring by a range of client surveillance tools). 
This paper includes a concise—in fact, simplified—picture 
of the technical landscape of Internet surveillance through a 
series of examples of data collection that might permit a state to 
come to know more about a surveillance target.  These examples 
help inform (and are informed by) the technical questions of 
what data are being actually and potentially monitored on the 
Internet and whom we are trusting to access (and potentially 
copy and re-use) those data.  This paper is meant to include 
enough of the major sorts of Internet surveillance to place any 
given activity or tool within a useful technical context. 
Internet surveillance can be broken down into three 
primary categories: network, server, and client.  The Internet is 
composed of clients and servers, in essence a series of devices 
which talk to one another through the network.  Every bit of 
data on the Internet is traveling or residing at one or more of 
these locations at any given time.  As such, any given Internet 
activity must happen at or across one (or more) of these 
locations.  In some cases, the line between client and server is 
blurry or non-existent, but the class of nodes that act as servers 
is large enough that it is useful to distinguish them from (other) 
clients.  In this model, anything residing on the client proper is 
treated as client-side Internet surveillance, including both 
software tools like workplace keylogging systems and hardware 
tools like keyboard tapping devices.  Any machine that 
predominantly accepts requests, processes them, and returns 
responses is treated as a server.  For simplicity, everything in 
between the client and the server is considered here to be the 
network, including the wires that the data travels and the 
routers that direct the traffic. 
A.  Network Surveillance 
At the highest level, a state can practice surveillance of 
Internet traffic that flows across the network.20  T h e  p o i n t  o f  
 
  20 See,  e.g., SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 19, 165-87. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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control used by the state might exist at the international 
gateway between two states or at some intermediate point in the 
network.  For those states that aspire to manage the network 
the most extensively, this control might function roughly as a 
“border control.”  In most places, though—and especially the 
United States—it would not be possible to establish a perfect 
ring around the geographic boundaries of the state.  Some 
states, such as China and Saudi Arabia, have sought to 
establish such means of network control.  The colorful example 
of the “great firewall of China” helps in a graphic sense to 
envision what the Chinese have sought to erect, but the image is 
only partially accurate; it both overstates the effectiveness of the 
wall at the national border and understates the extensiveness of 
the surveillance regime in China.  The British Government is 
reported to be considering a dramatic expansion to their 
network surveillance capabilities, in the form of a £12 billion 
surveillance center to monitor and store emails, web surfing 
records, and phone records on the nation’s largest 
telecommunications networks.21  Other states use intermediate 
mechanisms, such as Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), to force 
large amounts of network traffic to flow through a single point 
which might then be monitored.22  In other cases, such as the 
examples that follow, the point of control is on the network, but 
does not fall precisely at an international border. 
1.   Network Surveillance in the United States 
In the United States, the passage of the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994 was a 
 
  21 David  Leppard, Government will spy on every call and e-mail, THE SUNDAY TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4882600.ece 
(last visited Oct 8, 2008); Graham Tibbetts, Internet black boxes to record every email 
and website visit, THE  TELEGRAPH, Nov. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3384743/Internet-black-boxes-to-record-every-
email-and-website-visit.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 
  22 See e.g., Alan Levin, Creating National Internet Exchange Points in Africa, 
International Telecommunications Union Presentation, June 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/finance/work-cost-tariffs/events/tariff-seminars/south-africa-
05/presentation_levin-ixp-en.pdf  (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) (providing a description of 
IXPs and their general usage). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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watershed event in terms of network surveillance.23  CALEA 
requires that telecommunications companies build tools into 
their telephone networks that allow companies to respond 
quickly to law enforcement requests for wiretaps.24  CALEA 
filled an obvious gap: the growing use of a new generation of 
digital telephone switches did not inherently provide the same 
support for wiretapping as the older tools did.  In 2005, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) extended its 
interpretation of the law to require that Internet Service 
Providers (including universities, schools, libraries, and other 
such non-commercial ISPs) provide wiretapping access to a 
range of Internet data.25  The accessible data includes voice over 
IP (VoIP) Internet telephone services, such as Vonage and 
Skype; data about when and for how long Internet broadband 
subscribers connect to the Internet; and packet header data (the 
source and destination addresses and the port number) of all 
VoIP packets.26  In order to reduce the high cost of implementing 
this new interpretation of CALEA, the FCC has ruled that ISPs 
could forward their entire data stream to an independent 
“Trusted Third Party” to handle the wiretapping 
implementation.27  The effect of this ruling can be to expose the 
entire data stream of an ISP using this option to a third party.28  
The Department of Justice submitted a petition in 2007, yet to 
be ruled on, to include the packet header data of all Internet 
data, not just VoIP data, but web, email, instant message, and 
all other Internet traffic.29  CALEA does not provide legal 
 
  23 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2008). 
  24 Id. 
  25 See Federal Communications Commission, ET Docket No. 04-295 (Sept. 23, 2005), 
published 70 Fed. Reg. 59, 664 (Oct. 13, 2005). 
  26 See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Requires Certain Broadband and 
VoIP Providers to Accommodate Wiretaps, Aug. 5, 2005, available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260434A1.pdf (last visited Nov. 
11, 2008). 
  27 See  Federal Communications Commission, Order FCC 06-56 (2006). 
  28 Id. 
  29 See Susan Crawford blog, CALEA roundup: 2005-2007, available at 
http://scrawford.blogware.com/blog/_archives/2007/8/16/3162684.html (Aug. 16, 2007, 
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justification for anyone to access the provided data; it only 
mandates that the ISP build the technical capability to respond 
to such requests, the legality of which is in turn determined by 
other rules.30 
Reports suggest that the U.S. National Security Agency 
(NSA) is engaged in a much more intrusive form of network 
surveillance by mining the full stream of data passing through 
major ISP backbones.  AT&T engineer Mark Klein, after reading 
a story in the New York Times, reported that he had seen 
strange activity in a closet in an AT&T backbone building.31  
Klein had also seen documents describing data mining 
equipment in that closet.32  Such a box is likely capable of 
executing highly sophisticated queries on the data passing 
through the backbone.33  It is capable, for instance, of searching 
for any traffic (local or international) matching any of a set of 
complex profiles and forwarding the full contents of any 
matching data to the agency.34  But a so-called “black box” such 
as the one described by Klein, located in a closet, is the best 
example of equipment that is impossible to probe technically.   
We are left with indeterminate, circumstantial evidence about 
the existence and functionality of the box.  Questions about what 
data it is actually monitoring and who actually has access to the 
data remain unanswered. 
2. The Public and Private on International Networks: Three 
Cases 
Network-level surveillance is enabled directly by law in 
some instances.  In other cases, private forms of surveillance 
become possible because of the way that citizens seek to work 
around the state surveillance.  Three network surveillance 
 
  30 Id. 
  31 See John Markoff & Scott Shane, Documents Show Link Between AT&T and 
Agency in Eavesdropping Case, N.Y.  TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/nationalspecial3/13nsa.html (last visited Nov. 25, 
2008). 
  32 Id. at A7. 
  33 Id. 
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examples from outside the United States are instructive in this 
regard. 
a. Sweden: FRA and Relakks 
On June 18, 2008, Swedish lawmakers passed a bill giving 
its National Defense Radio Establishment (Försvarets 
radioanstalt, or FRA) the authority to monitor without a 
warrant, all phone calls and Internet traffic crossing its border.35  
The FRA had previously been responsible only for intercepting 
radio signals, though there are reports that it has been 
monitoring phone calls and emails prior to the new law going 
into effect in 2009.36  The new law will allow the Swedish 
government to access not just the data about phone calls and 
Internet traffic (who talked to whom when), but the content of 
the traffic itself when it crosses the Swedish border.37  A l l  
Swedish ISPs will be required to install FRA monitoring 
equipment within their networks.38 
There are means by which Internet users can avoid such 
network-level surveillance capabilities, but these means of 
evading the state’s surveillance mechanisms may lead to further 
surveillance by private parties (which, in turn, might give those 
data to the very state agencies that the user sought to avoid).  
Relakks is a privacy and filtering circumvention tool that uses 
virtual private network (VPN) technology to encrypt and route 
all of its users’ traffic through Sweden.39  The tool gives its users 
 
  35 See Sara Sundelius, Sweden adopts controversial law to allow secret tapping of e-
mails, phone calls, Associated Press, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 18, 2008, available at  
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/06/18/europe/EU-GEN-Sweden-E-mail-Spying.php 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  36 See Svt.se, Ingen förundersökning mot FRA, July 14, 2008, available at 
http://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=22620&a=1173950&lid=puff_1173812&lpos=rubrik 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  37 See PrivacyInternational.org, PHR2006 - Kingdom of Sweden,  Dec. 18, 2007, 
available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559487 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  38 See DW-World.de, Swedish Government Clears Hurdles to Pass Surveillance Bill, 
June 19, 2008,  available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3421627,00.html 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  39 See https://www.relakks.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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privacy from snooping conducted by their own ISPs and 
consequently provides defense against the network level 
filtering that the OpenNet Initiative has documented in 
countries around the world.40  This network level filtering 
consists of surveilling a subset of the traffic that crosses the 
relatively few routers that process nearly all Internet traffic.   
For instance, dozens of countries filter all Internet traffic 
crossing the digital border by running filtering software on the 
small number of routers that connect them to the outside 
world41.  Relakks is one of many tools that routes around this 
network level filtering by encrypting and routing requests 
through a machine in a non-filtering country.  By encrypting the 
request until it arrives at a machine that reroutes the 
conversation to the requested site, the circumvention tool 
prevents the filtering router from determining the location or 
content of the site.  This process of rerouting conversations to 
shift places on the network is known as proxying.  When 
someone in China uses a circumvention tool hosted in Sweden to 
proxy-request a page from the BBC’s web server, instead of 
talking directly from China to Britain, the connection goes from 
China to Sweden and then from the U.S. to Britain (and back 
along the same route).  This form of circumvention can also be 
effective against other sources of filtering (for instance, school or 
ISP filtering of music sharing traffic) as well to “country shift” 
the connection to allow the user to access content that is 
restricted (filtered) to users connecting from Sweden or Europe.  
But such re-routed traffic now goes through a state where both a 
private party and a government agency have the authority to 
listen to the conversation.  The net effect: those trying to evade 
circumvention or surveillance through Relakks may unwittingly 
be exposing themselves to (potentially more extensive) 
surveillance by the FRA. 
 
  40 See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 
(Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, & Jonathan Zittrain eds., Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2008). 
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b. United Kingdom: British Telecom and Phorm 
A case involving the giant telecommunications firm, British 
Telecom (BT), illustrates a similar point.  In June and July of 
2007, several BT Internet customers noticed strange activity 
during some of their Internet sessions.42  Some of the users 
noticed performance problems; others found that some sites 
were not loading correctly, and all noticed extraneous traffic to 
the same system, dns.sysip.net, which was owned by a company, 
121Media, that various anti-virus tools reported to be associated 
with rootkit spyware.43  One user reinstalled his system from 
scratch after being told by BT customer service that his 
computer was likely infected by some sort of malware, only to 
find the same suspicious activity on the freshly installed 
system.44  These users came to the conclusion that BT was 
involved somehow with 121Media, either intentionally or 
through some sort of intrusion.  In response to questions from 
the users and from reporter Chris Williams of The Register, BT’s 
customer service and its press office insisted that they had 
nothing to do with the suspicious behavior.45  Phorm refused to 
comment.46  By the end of the month, users reported the 
disappearance of the suspicious traffic, and chatter about the 
matter died without further notice.47 
In February, 2008, Phorm (the new name of 121Media) 
publicly announced a deal with BT, as well as with other major 
 
  42 See Posting of Frank Rizzo to thinkbroadband.com, available at 
http://bbs.adslguide.org.uk/showflat.php?Cat=&Board=bt&Number=3047764&page=3&v
iew=expanded&sb=7&o=0&fpart=all&vc=1 (July 2, 2007, 10:35:12 EST) (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2008). 
  43 See Posting of Filippo Spike Morelli to SpikeLab.org, available at  
http://www.spikelab.org/blog/btProxyHorror.html (July 9, 2007) (last visited Nov. 25, 
2008). 
  44 See Ryan Naraine, Spyware, Rootkit Maker Stops Distribution, eWeek.com, May 
10, 2006,  available at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Spyware-Rootkit-Maker-Stops-
Distribution/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  45 See Chris Williams, ISP data deal with former ‘spyware’ boss triggers privacy 
fears,  THE  REGISTER, Mar. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/17/bt_phorm_lies/print.html (last visited Nov. 25, 
2008). 
  46 Id. 
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British Internet service providers TalkTalk and Virgin Media, to 
offer “a free consumer internet feature, Webwise, which ensures 
fewer irrelevant adverts and additional protection against 
malicious websites.”48  Williams quickly connected the 
announcement with the 2007 reports and posted a piece 
accusing Phorm and BT of cooperating to monitor.49  By March, 
Phorm had admitted that it had undertaken a trial of its 
technology involving tens of thousands of users on the BT 
network with BT’s participation, but without the knowledge of 
the users.50  Privacy advocates reacted strongly against Phorm’s 
monitoring of user connections since the revelation of the BT 
deal and of the secret trial, postponing any further use of Phorm 
on the BT network.  But as of July 2008, BT planned to begin 
another trial of Phorm’s system within a few weeks, though this 
time with an opt-in mechanism.51 
Phorm attempts to allay privacy concerns by claiming that 
it does not store any personally identifying information or any 
specific information about the browsing habits of tracked 
users.52  Instead, Phorm stores a persistent and unique, but 
randomly generated, Phorm identification number for each user, 
along with a list of the advertising categories triggered by each 
of the user’s web requests.53  So when a user requests a page 
about the Ford Expedition from ford.com, Phorm stores only the 
 
  48 See BT PLC, TalkTalk and Virgin Media Inc confirm exclusive agreements with 
Phorm, Phorm, Inc. Feb. 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.phorm.com/about/launch_agreement.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  49 See Chris Williams, ISP data deal with former 'spyware' boss triggers privacy 
fears, THE  REGISTER, Feb.  25, 2008, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/02/25/phorm_isp_advertising/ (last visited Nov. 25, 
2008). 
  50 See Chris Williams, BT admits misleading customers over Phorm experiments, 
THE  REGISTER, Mar. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/17/bt_phorm_lies/print.html (last visited Nov. 25, 
2008). 
  51 See Philip Stafford, BT to begin further trials of ad technology, FT.com, July 16, 
2008,  available at  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34c59420-5356-11dd-8dd2-
000077b07658.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  52 See  Privacy : Phorm : No Personal Information, PHORM,  INC.,  available at 
http://privacy.phorm.com/no_personal_info.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
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fact that the user (identified only by the Phorm identification 
marker) requested a page indicating interest in an SUV (or 
perhaps even in a Ford Expedition) rather than the details of 
the content or the specific URL of the request.54  Phorm uses 
these interest categories to serve targeted ads to customers in 
spots on web pages that it sells to content producers.55  Further, 
Phorm installs machines inside its participating ISPs that inject 
its own cookie into every request, allowing it to track which user 
is connecting to which site and to identify each user to its 
targeted ad server.56 
c. Pakistan: YouTube and AnchorFree 
In February 2008, the Pakistani state told all Pakistani 
Internet service providers to block local access to a specific URL 
on the popular US-based video-sharing service, YouTube.com.57  
The authorities ostensibly sought to block Pakistani citizens 
from viewing a video hosted on YouTube that was perceived to 
be too critical of Islam.58  One of the Pakistani ISPs responded 
not just by blocking access to the single URL within Pakistan, 
but instead by blocking access to the entire YouTube.com site 
(and, in the process, blocking global access to YouTube.com for a 
short while through a network anomaly).59 
During those few days that Pakistan was blocking 
YouTube.com locally, many Pakistanis continued to access 
YouTube.com by using tools to circumvent the filter, including 
Hotspot Shield, a free tool by a company called AnchorFree.60  
 
  54 Id. 
  55 Id. 
  56 See Richard Clayton, The Phorm “Webwise” System, May 18, 2008, available at 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/080518-phorm.pdf. 
  57  Posting of Sally Walkerman to OpenNet Initiative Blog, available at 
http://opennet.net/blog/2008/02/pakistan%E2%80%99s-internet-has-a-bad-weekend (Feb. 
25, 2008 12:10 EST). 
  58 Id. 
  59  Posting of Ethan Zuckerman to My heart’s in Accra, available at 
http://ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/02/25 (Feb. 25, 2008 15:41 EST). 
  60 Sylvie Barak, Pakistan Becomes VPN Routing Hot-spot, THE INQUIRER, Feb. 26, 
2008,  available at http://www.theinquirer.net/gb/inquirer/news/2008/02/26/pakistan-
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AnchorFree describes its Hotspot Shield tool as: “Hotspot Shield 
creates a virtual private network (VPN) between your laptop or 
iPhone and our Internet gateway.  This impenetrable tunnel 
prevents snoopers and hackers from viewing your email, instant 
messages, credit card information or anything else you send over 
a wireless network.”61 
But AnchorFree is, at its core, an advertising company 
which tracks the web browsing habits of its users.62  What 
AnchorFree’s description does not say is that AnchorFree makes 
money from the otherwise “free” tool by displaying ads to users 
within web pages.  By using HotSpot Shield, users give 
AnchorFree complete access to all data exchanged while web 
browsing with the tool.  AnchorFree provides an option to its 
users to remove the inserted banner ads and implies (but never 
explicitly says) that it does not monitor its users’ traffic, but it 
nonetheless still has the ability to snoop on the data at any time.  
Thus, while the Pakistani state is watching its citizens’ Internet 
traffic to block content it does not like, citizens are watching the 
blocked content by using a tool that circumvents Pakistan’s 
filters.  However, the circumvention tool itself could function as 
a monitoring tool, albeit likely for a different purpose. 
3.   Network Surveillance Data 
Three sorts of data are vulnerable to surveillance on the 
network: (1) routing information, (2) the actual content of the 
data stream, and (3) contextual signatures.  All Internet data 
packets must include the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the 
ultimate recipient.  The Internet works more or less like a 
guided game of hot potato, with each packet of data getting 
passed through a series of intermediate routing computers that 
pass the packet on to another router closer to the end 
destination.  In order to perform this function, every router 
along the way must include the address of the ultimate 
 
  61 AnchorFree  Inc.,  AnchorFree History,  available at 
http://anchorfree.com/downloads/hotspot-shield/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2008). 
  62 AnchorFree, Inc., How it Works,  available at http://anchorfree.com/advertisers-
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destination.  Most data packets, all using the TCP protocol, 
including all web and email traffic, also include the IP address 
of the sender, such that data can be sent back along the same 
channel. 
Users can hide routing information on the network by using 
a proxy that forwards communications between a client and a 
server.  Using a proxy allows a user to include the proxy’s 
address as the recipient in the packet routing data and move the 
ultimate recipient data into the content of the packet proper.   
The proxy receives the packet, looks inside the packet content 
for the ultimate recipient, and forwards the packet on to the 
recipient.  Routers between the sender and proxy that look at 
the packet routing data see only that the client is sending a 
packet to the proxy.  Likewise, routers between the proxy and 
the recipient that look at the packet routing data see only that 
the proxy is sending a packet to the recipient.  No single router, 
other than the proxy itself, sees that the sender is 
communicating directly with the recipient. 
In addition to these routing data, the packets contain the 
content of the data.  The content includes both protocol-specific 
data and the content proper of the communication.  The 
protocol-specific data includes data about the URL requested, 
the referring URL, the user agent, and so on for web requests as 
well as data that describe the originating email server, the from 
email address, the date and so on for emails.  The content proper 
of the communication includes, but is not limited to, any data 
submitted to web server forms, any web pages retrieved, any 
emails sent or received, and any videos watched or songs 
downloaded.  Any communications of any significant size are 
divided into separate packets for travel across the network, 
making it more expensive but not impossible for routers along 
the way to recreate the entire content objects (whole web pages, 
videos, and so forth) than to snoop on the routing information of 
a given packet or to look for simple patterns like keywords in a 
single packet. 
Users can hide the content of their communications on the 
network by encrypting their messages, preventing anyone other 
than the sender or recipient from monitoring the data in 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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between the end-points.  Encryption is most effective when it is 
applied end-to-end, so that the entire stream of data from the 
client to the server is encrypted, allowing no one on the network 
between the sender and the receiver from reading the content.  
Secure web (HTTPS) and email (SMTPS, IMAPS, POPS) 
protocols, when properly configured, are examples of this sort of 
end-to-end encryption.  End-to-end encryption has to be 
negotiated by both the client and the server; however, many 
servers do not support encrypted communication, or only do so 
for some subset of content or functionality.  In these cases, a 
user can connect through a proxy to encrypt the data from the 
client to the proxy.  But such encrypting proxies still have 
unencrypted channels that enable them to talk to servers that 
do not support encryption, such that the proxied content 
remains readable to some routers on the network. 
Communications that are both encrypted and proxied can 
hide both the routing information for and the content of a 
communication from the network between the client and the 
proxy.  But even proxied and encrypted data leaks some 
information about the communication between the parties: the 
timing, number, and size of the packets as well as the fact that 
the communication is proxied and encrypted give away 
information about the transaction.  In some cases, the mere fact 
that the data is encrypted prompts suspicions about the users 
and gives rise to further surveillance.  Different sorts of traffic 
generate different signatures of packet size and timing that can 
allow easy identification of the nature of the communication.63 
4. Network Surveillance and the Problem of Trust 
The number of links on the Internet is the same as the sum 
of the number of clients, servers, and routers, roughly speaking, 
 
  63 See Charles Wright, Lucas Ballard, Scott Coulls, Fabian Monrose, & Gerald 
Masson,  Spot Me if You Can: Recovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP 
Conversations (forthcoming, Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
May, 2008); see also Charles Wright, Lucas Ballard, Fabian Monrose & Gerald Masson, 
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all the computers hooked up to this global network of networks.  
If monitoring the network required monitoring each one of those 
hundreds of millions of links, network monitoring on a large 
scale would be prohibitively expensive for even the most well-
funded law enforcement or intelligence agencies.  In practice, all 
Internet traffic flows through a much smaller number of routers, 
and those routers are controlled by an even smaller number of 
Autonomous Systems (AS) that agree to use the Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) to direct the traffic amongst themselves.  These 
AS’s are generally commercial ISPs, though they can also be 
managed by companies, governments, universities and other 
large organizations.  There are fewer than a hundred thousand 
of these AS’s in the world.  The vast majority of Internet traffic 
flows through a much smaller number of those AS’s.64  Traffic 
within a given country generally stays on AS’s located within 
that country, with some exceptions for countries with very little 
Internet usage.  For a combination of technical, business, and 
policy reasons, a disproportionate amount of global Internet 
traffic flows through a few very large AS’s in the United States, 
including most traffic between Europe and Asia.65 
This topology of the Internet has a few different 
implications for the actors trusted with access to Internet data.  
The first is that a large majority of users need to access the 
Internet through an AS, usually a commercial ISP.  These users 
are therefore vulnerable to surveillance by that AS itself.  The 
second is that there are a relatively small number of these AS’s 
within any given country, so monitoring all of the network 
traffic in a given country is a relatively manageable task; the 
state simply needs to require a small number of AS’s to monitor 
their networks.  This applies doubly for international Internet 
traffic, which is controlled by an even smaller number of AS’s 
but are disproportionately located in the United States.  Thus 
 
  64 See BGP: The Border Gateway Protocol Advanced Internet Routing Resources, 
Global Internet Exchange Points / BGP Peering Points / IXP,  available at 
http://www.bgp4.as/internet-exchanges (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). 
  65 Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis, IPv4 Internet Topology Report 
as Internet Graph, available at http://www.caida.org/research/topology/as_core_network/ 
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monitoring international traffic within a given country requires 
the participation of even fewer AS’s.  The United States is 
capable of monitoring a large portion of international Internet 
traffic through a few of its AS’s, including even traffic flowing 
between two non-U.S. countries.66 
If a citizen wishes to hide her data on the network, her 
most likely strategy would be to move her trust around.  In the 
process, though, the user must trust one or more actors with his 
or her data.  One common approach to sharing trust in this 
manner is to use the Tor system to defend oneself against traffic 
analysis.  In so doing, however, a user relies to a certain extent 
upon others on the network who are operating parts of the Tor 
network and whose machines relay information to others on the 
network.67  Likewise, a user who tries to get around Phorm 
surveillance of her local ISP connection has only a few choices of 
ISPs in the United Kingdom, most of which have been reported 
to be considering adding Phorm monitoring to their networks.  
The user may choose to stay on the possibly monitored local 
network, but use a service like Relakks to proxy and encrypt her 
data as it travels through the local, Phorm monitoring, ISP.  The 
user will avoid Phorm monitoring in the process, but at the cost 
of trusting not only Relakks but also the Swedish ISP through 
which Relakks talks to the Internet and the Swedish 
government that has legislated access to the data flowing 
through all Swedish ISPs.  Her local ISP will still have the 
ability to tell that she is proxying and encrypting all of her data 
through a third party, which fact itself might prove suspicious if 
queried by a law enforcement.  Finally, the user’s data is 
vulnerable to network monitoring at any point along which it 
travels, from her local ISP to the server’s ISP to any ISPs 
between that carry the data.  Even setting aside the monitoring 
possibilities on her local ISP, a large portion of her data is likely 
to travel outside of Europe and is there likely to flow through 
one of a few U.S. ISPs that process a disproportionate share of 
international Internet traffic.  The point is that, in evading 
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traffic analysis and other forms of online surveillance, a user 
will have to trust someone—or a series of people—to some 
extent in order to communicate via the network. 
B. Server Surveillance 
Surveillance also takes place commonly at the server level.  
In this taxonomy, servers include the computers that large 
corporations use to provide access to online services to 
consumers.  Far more data are likely collected each day, by more 
parties, at the server level than through the network 
surveillance examples described above.  But rarely do states 
directly have access to these data; a law enforcement or 
intelligence official would have to obtain it through the 
corporate or other institutional data-holder. 
1.   The Fuss About Google 
Americans have begun to worry that perhaps Google’s 
engineers know too much about what we do.  To address these 
worries, Google has published a series of videos on YouTube that 
explain the privacy implications of the data collected by its 
search engine.  A spokeswoman on one of these videos is named 
Ms. Ohye, a professional, reassuring-sounding support engineer.  
In the video, she explains what sorts of data Google collects and, 
implicitly, why users should not be particularly concerned about 
the data collection.  Ms. Ohye says: 
To improve our search results, as well as maintain security and 
prevent fraud, we remember some basic information about 
searches. Without this information, our search engine wouldn’t 
work as well as it does or be as secure.  .  .  . We’re able to 
[replace ‘carss’ with ‘cars’] because we’ve studied search queries 
in our logs and found that when people type in ‘carss’ they 
often really mean ‘cars.’ . . .  Only your provider can directly 
match you with your IP address. . . .  What a cookie doesn’t tell 
Google is personal stuff about you like where you live and what 
your phone number is. . . .  In the same way that a store keeps 
a receipt of your purchases, Google keeps a type of receipt of 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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your visit called a log. . . .  As you can see, logs don’t contain 
any truly personal information about you.68 
User search data does help in the way Google says it does 
(“improve our search results,” “maintain security,” and “prevent 
fraud”).  Ms. Ohye’s descriptions of the way Google collects data 
are true in a technical sense.  But the importance of data is 
determined by the larger world in which it lives - by the other 
data to which it connects.  So when Ms. Ohye asserts that a 
cookie does not tell Google “personal stuff about you like where 
you live,”69 this is only true in the sense that the cookie that 
contains your driver’s license number does not tell the police 
where you live.  However, even though the cookie itself is just a 
random string of letters, as with a driver’s license number, it can 
indeed be used to lookup personal information “like where you 
live.” 
For example, the cookie might connect, reasonably well, all 
searches performed by a single person.  Many people search for 
their own names and addresses at some point (if for no other 
reason than to see their houses in Google Maps).  The cookie 
might connect those two searches to the same (otherwise 
pseudonymous) person, thus potentially identifying the name 
and address of the person behind the random gibberish of a 
particular cookie.  This method of identification is not perfect, 
but researchers have consistently shown the ability to crack the 
identity of individual users in these kinds of data collections 
with anonymous but individually unique identifiers, most 
dramatically on supposedly anonymized data sets released by 
AOL and Netflix.70 
 
  68  Google, Inc., Google Search Privacy: Plain and Simple, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLgJYBRzUXY (Aug. 8, 2007). 
  69 Id. 
  70 See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 
4417749, N.Y.  TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?ex=1312776000 (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2008); Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of 
Large Datasets, How To Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset,  available at 
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0610105 (last visited Nov. 28, 2008).   See also Christopher 
Soghoian, The Problem of Anonymous Vanity Searches, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 299, 300 (2007). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
2008]  THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE AT THE BORDER  267 
In fact, it is likely that this collection of search terms, IP 
addresses, and cookies represents one of the largest single 
collections of personal data on or offline.  Google may or may not 
choose to do the work necessary to translate its collection of 
search data into a database of personally identifiable data, but it 
does have the data and the ability to query personal data out of 
the collection at any time if it chooses.  Even if Google’s staff 
never chooses to access these data, an intruder or disgruntled 
employee may query the data himself, or a state may demand 
access to it, with the force of law behind its request.  And even 
assuming perfect security, Google is still subject to many sorts of 
government requests, as demonstrated by the success of the 
recent subpoena by Viacom for Google’s entire retained history 
of which users watched which YouTube videos.71 
One of the key Google services, AdWords, is a contextual 
online advertising system that displays ads on Google and its 
partner search sites, major content sites like the New York 
Times, and, through the AdSense program, on a huge number of 
small content providers like blogs.  Through AdWords, Google 
targets ads to relevant consumers by displaying ads based on 
the current interests of a user.  For ads on search pages, it 
displays ads related to the keywords entered by the user for the 
given search.  For example, a user who searches for “digital 
camera” will see ads targeted to people interested in digital 
cameras.  For ads on content providers, the system displays ads 
relevant to the keywords present in the content itself.  So an 
article on digital cameras on a blog will draw AdWords ads 
about digital cameras.  Advertisers bid for the right to advertise 
on desired keywords.  An advertiser who wants to advertise to 
users interested in digital cameras has to win a continuous 
action for the term “digital camera” (or one of a host of related 
terms).  At any given time, the ads that appear with a given 
term are those who owners have made the highest bids for a 
single click on an ad that appears alongside a search (or a page 
of relevant content) for the bid keyword. 
 
  71 Miguel  Helft,  Google Told to Turn Over User Data of YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
2008,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/technology/04youtube.html (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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Google watches consumers click on ads through its 
AdWords system and watches the advertisers through AdWords 
auctions that determine the value of advertising topics.  Content 
providers watch the value of those advertising topics to 
determine which sorts of content to publish.  The advertisers use 
the Adwords system as a stateless form of market research to 
target consumers without knowing anything about them.   
Content providers watch consumers to determine which sorts of 
content generate the most interest.  The combined effect of these 
activities is to create a system of surveillance that collectively 
monitors what topics content producers are writing about, what 
topics users are searching for, and what the value of those topics 
(or rather the users who are reading about those topics) is to 
advertisers. 
All of the monitoring that happens within this system of 
surveillance happens in real time.  Google adjusts the placement 
of ads in real time according to the current results of the 
auction, content providers watch the profitability of their 
content in real time and make adjustments to attract more ad 
clicking customers, and advertisers adjust their bids and update 
their ads in real time to attract more users.  The effect of the 
system is continuous but stateless market research that is 
constantly adjusting to the current interests of users rather than 
the historical interests over time tracked by user profiling 
organizations like comScore, Phorm, and NebuAd. 
2.   Server Surveillance Data 
A server has access only to data that is sent directly to it 
over the network, which consists of the client address, the time 
of the communication, and the protocol-specific request (in the 
case of an http server, the URL, referrer, user agent, and any 
cookies).  The server also likely captures the content explicitly 
submitted by the user, including names, addresses, credit card 
numbers, health problems, sexual proclivities, and so on.  All of 
these data, other than the client and the time of the transaction, 
may be encrypted while traveling over the network, giving the 
end server access to some data that is not available on the 
network.  For web servers, the protocol data may include 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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cookies, which are often used to assign to the requesting user a 
pseudonymous identity that remains the same between separate 
requests. 
3.   Server Surveillance Trust 
People voluntarily, if not exactly knowingly, submit vast 
amounts of data to Internet servers.  When one pauses to think 
about it, one may be aware that one is submitting names, 
addresses, and credit card numbers to Amazon when buying a 
new book, personal email to Microsoft through the popular free 
service Hotmail, movie preferences to Netflix when renting 
videos, medical information when using online personal health 
services, and all manner of personal information when 
connecting to others through social networks or online dating 
services.72  What determines the risk of privacy intrusions is not 
so much the data itself as what the actors controlling the servers 
do with the data, with whom they share it, and how the data are 
later combined with other data.  So, for some users, allowing a 
company to collect a credit card number to execute a purchase is 
fine, but using that same credit card number to request data 
about the user’s purchase history from the credit card company 
in order to target advertising to him or her is not fine.  Likewise, 
it may be fine for Microsoft to collect personal emails through 
Hotmail, but it becomes a concern if Microsoft were to sell its 
users’ email content to a consumer research company.  A 
consumer may be pleased that Netflix uses video preference 
information for its own recommendation engine, but many users 
would be uncomfortable if they found out that Netflix was 
combining its users’ video rental history with (even public) 
information from users’ Bebo social networking pages to make 
 
  72 In a further twist to this story, users sometimes seek to protect communications 
by using supposedly secure services, only to have those service providers turn over data 
to law enforcement officials.  See, e.g., 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/steroids.source.prod_affiliate.25.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2008).  One prominent case involved the Canadian email provider Hushmail, 
which, according to court documents, assisted U.S. law enforcement authorities by 
turning over emails relating to the activities of suspected criminals in the United States.  
Id. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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video recommendations. 
All of these different possible uses of data represent 
networks of trust which the user must evaluate.  The Google 
story provides an example of the complexity and confusion 
surrounding these issues of trust.  Studies of users of all ages, 
but especially young people, suggest that few have a clear idea 
about how data is collected, who has access to it, and what is 
done with it.73  The potential of Google’s vast store of user data 
creates a serious risk of disclosure throughout this network of 
trust, regardless of Google’s intentions. 
Sometimes the risk is more than theoretical.  Over the past 
several years, many users around the world have come to rely 
upon the Skype service for voice over Internet protocol calling 
and online chat.  The service has often been touted as among the 
most secure ways for dissidents and activists to communicate.74  
However, Internet researcher Nart Villeneuve found that “[t]he 
full text chat messages of TOM-Skype users, along with Skype 
users who have communicated with TOM-Skype users, are 
regularly scanned for sensitive keywords, and if present, the 
resulting data are uploaded and stored on servers in China.”75  
In other words, while Internet activists were trusting Skype 
with their communications, keyword monitoring of their chat in 
China directly resulted in the potential for state surveillance of 
their supposedly private communications.76 
 
  73 P ALFREY & GASSER, supra note 5, at 39-82. 
  74 See Robert Amsterdam, Technology’s Threat to Human Rights and Free Speech, 
(Oct. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/10/technologys_threat_to_human_ri.htm (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
  75 N ART  VILLENEUVE, INFORMATION  WARFARE  MONITOR/  ONI  ASIA  JOINT  REPORT, 
BREACHING TRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY PRACTICES ON CHINA’S 
TOM-SKYPE  PLATFORM  4  (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.infowar-
monitor.net/breachingtrust.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
  76 John  Markoff,  Surveillance of Skype Messages Found in China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2008, at C1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/technology/internet/02skype.html (last visited Nov. 
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4. Server Surveillance Implications 
Google’s current policy is to keep a log of each search query 
with a complete IP address for eighteen months and then 
remove a portion of the IP address to make it harder to resolve 
back to a specific user.77  Data retention rules, such as the 
European Union Data Retention Directive, mean that a given 
firm may be—or perceive itself to be—compelled to retain more 
information about users for greater periods of time.  The 
scrubbing of server data provides only limited protection against 
identification since the combination of search terms over time 
can still be used to resolve the data to individual users.  The 
combination of technological change, rules and practices of data 
retention, and individual willingness to share private 
information with firms gives rise to a growing potential for data 
related problems at the server level. 
C.  Client Surveillance 
1.   Government Surveillance at the Client Level 
Governments have various levels of control over and access 
to the data collected by client side software, but they also use 
this software to directly collect data in certain instances.  The 
uses of client side software can be difficult to uncover, but the 
practice of using it is well-known.  For example, United States 
court documents reveal that in 2007 the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) installed a keylogger on a suspect’s machine to 
capture the encryption keys necessary to read the suspect’s PGP 
(Pretty Good Privacy) encrypted email.78  In fact, the alleged 
New Jersey organized crime boss, Nicholas Scarfo, was caught 
through the FBI’s use of a keylogger on a personal computer.79  
 
  77  Posting of Chris Soghoian to CNET news blog, available at 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-10038963-46.html (Sept. 11, 2008, 7:40 PDT). 
  78 Declan McCullagh, Feds Use Keylogger to Thwart PGP, Hushmail, CNET News 
Blog, (July 10, 2007), available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9741357-7.html 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
  79 Electronic Privacy Information Center, United States v. Scarfo, Criminal No. 00-
404 (D.N.J.), available at http://epic.org/crypto/scarfo.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
272  MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 78.2 
Some major anti-virus companies have received and complied 
with court orders to ignore the presence of government agency 
spyware when scanning for viruses.80  Similarly, there is 
evidence that the German police are aggressively pursuing the 
use of client side software to calls placed on the Skype Internet 
telephone service.81  The software used in both cases includes 
features identical to those in malware, including remote 
installation via a trojan or virus, remote control and data 
reporting, and stealth features (and policies) that hide the 
software from the user. 
A variety of companies make keyboard logging devices that 
are hardware, rather than software.  These devices tend to take 
the form of small plugs that sit between the USB plug of the 
logged keyboard and the USB plug of the logged computer.  The 
devices record every key pressed on the keyboard and therefore 
can be used to capture passwords, emails, typed documents, and 
any such information entered on the keyboard. These devices 
are much easier to install than software keyloggers, so long as 
the installer has physical access to the machine, and they are 
impossible to detect via anti-virus software.  A company called 
KeyCarbon distributes a PCI keylogger.82  As a PCI card, this 
device is attached to the motherboard inside the computer case, 
giving it all of the advantages of a USB keylogger (though 
requiring a few minutes instead of a few seconds to install) but 
making the device much more difficult to detect via visual 
inspection.83  The only way to detect this device is physically to 
open the computer case and then looking inside the box in the 
 
  80 Posting of Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache to CNET News blog, available at 
http://news.cnet.com/Will-security-firms-detect-police-spyware/2100-7348_3-
6197020.html (July 17, 2007, 9:40 PDT). 
  81  Posting of Louis Charbonneau to Reuters News Blog, available at 
http://www/reuters.com/article/technologynews/idusl21173920071122 (Nov. 23, 2007, 
12:28 EST); see also posting of Kim Zetter to Wired Blog Network, available at 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/leaked-document.html (Jan. 29, 2008, 16:10 
EST). 
  82 KeyCarbon  Computer  Security Hardware, available at 
http://www.keycarbon.com/products/keycarbon_laptop/overview/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2008). 
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right place.84 
2.   Market Research 
ComScore Incorporated is one of several large companies 
that collect data about Internet users for market research.   
ComScore collects the entire web browsing stream, including 
encrypted requests, from the two million members of its 
“consumer panel.”85  It claims to try to avoid capturing data like 
usernames, passwords, and credit card numbers, but actively 
collects personal information that directly identifies the owner of 
the web browsing data.86  ComScore touts the ability to connect 
this online data to a variety of other consumer databases, 
including supermarket purchases and automobile 
registrations.87  It has admitted in the past to using its 
monitoring data to lookup information in its panel members’ 
online banking accounts to verify the household incomes 
reported in surveys.88 
ComScore recruits these panel members through a 
combination of sweepstakes, network performance improvement 
tools, claims of anti-malware protection, and an appeal to those 
who seek to improve the efficiency of the Internet.89  ComScore 
discloses to the panel members that the software is monitoring 
their web browsing activities, but it also keeps a strong 
separation between itself and the operations that collect the 
data, currently OpinionSquare and PermissionResearch, by not 
directly naming the tools or the organizations that operate them 
anywhere on comScore.com or even in its SEC annual report 
filing, and it has had to recreate those operations at least once to 
 
  84 Id. 
  85  comScore, Inc., comScore Methodology, available at 
http://www.comscore.com/method/method.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). 
  86 Id. 
  87 Id. 
  88  Posting of Evan Hansen to CNET News Blog, available at 
http://www.news.com/Net-privacy-and-the-myth-of-self-regulation/2010-1071_3-
281580.html (Oct. 16, 2001, 4:00 PDT). 
  89 See comScore, supra note 86. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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evade detection by anti-spyware tools.90  ComScore sells this 
vast trove of data, estimated by comScore at 28 terabytes 
collected per month in 2007, as market research to many of the 
largest companies in the world.91  ComScore is far from alone in 
collecting vast amounts of data about individuals for the 
purposes of greasing the wheels of commerce, online and off; 
ChoicePoint, its parent company LexisNexis, and many others 
are in the business of serving as “data brokers.”92 
3.   Malware and Antivirus Software 
Though the furthest cry from the man in the van with 
headphones, malware installed on an individual’s computer can 
perform some of the most intrusive surveillance possible using 
today’s technology.  A motley assortment of computer programs 
and related systems called bots, virus, worms, trojans, and other 
malware infect up to twenty-five percent of all computers 
connected to the Internet.93  All of these malware programs are 
surveillance devices: they have complete access to all data 
entering, leaving, or residing on the client computer.  Malware 
programs generally use their access to user data to perform a 
variety of illicit activities including sending spam, committing 
click fraud, attacking other computers, and stealing financial or 
other identifying information from the client.  The direct impact 
of most of these activities on any given infected user is relatively 
small—outgoing spam only costs the user bandwidth and even 
 
  90 Hoovers, United States Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K Annual 
Report for comScore, Inc., available at 
http://www.hoovers.com/free/co/secdoc.xhtml?ID=113840&ipage=5792564 (filed on Mar. 
11, 2008); see also p o s t i n g  o f  S t e f a n i e  O l s e n  t o  C N E T  N e w s  B l o g ,  available at 
http://news.cnet.com/ComScore-Spyware-or-researchware/2100-1032_3-5494004.html 
(Dec. 20, 2004, 4:00 PST). 
  91 See Tom Taulli, comScore Busts a Move, The Motley Fool, June 28, 2007, available 
at http://www.fool.com/investing/high-growth/2007/06/28/comscore-busts-a-move.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 
  92 Martin H. Bosworth, Lexis-Nexis Parent to Buy Choicepoint, (Feb. 23, 2008), 
available at http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/02/choicepoint_sale.html (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2008). 
  93 Tim Weber, Business Editor, BBC News Online, Criminals may overwhelm the 
web, (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6298641.stm (last 
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credit card theft is generally insured by the credit card company. 
These malware programs have the potential to exploit more 
directly the vast trove of personal data stored on the vast 
number of infected machines, as demonstrated by the Sircam 
worm in 2001.94  Like many worms of its era, the Sircam worm 
propagated by sending a copy of itself to every email address in 
each infected computer’s address book.95  Unlike other worms, 
however, Sircam tried to fool its targets into opening the 
infecting payload by attaching a trojan to a document picked 
randomly from the victim’s own computer.96 
The primary effect of the worm, other than clogging up the 
network, was to send the randomly chosen private files of over a 
million people to a list of their friends, families, colleagues, and 
digital acquaintances.97  T h e  New York Times, for instance, 
reported receiving a travel diary, a document about a father’s 
will, and a memo from a real estate branch manager that “offers 
colleagues ‘Objectives For The Year 2000,’ the first of which is, 
‘Positive attitude at all times.’”98  Others reported receiving 
“memos, CVs, job listings, diary entries, expense forms and 
complaint letters.”99  For many, the disclosure of these 
documents, particularly to friends and colleagues, represented 
serious breaches of privacy with significant personal 
repercussions. 
Most malware, circa 2008, tries to hide itself from detection.  
It tends to avoid heavy-handed tactics like those of the Sircam 
worm.  Modern malware largely restricts itself to hijacking the 
 
  94 Symantec,  w32sircamworm@mm_2007,  available at 
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-071720-1640-
99&tabid=2 (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). 
  95 Id. 
  96 Id. 
  97 Id. 
  98  Richard Meislin, Compressed Data: A Virus, Yes, but One That Brings Interesting 
Things, N.Y.  TIMES, (July 30, 2001), available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00EEDA103DF933A05754C0A9679C
8B63 (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
  99 Mark Ward, Technology Correspondent, BBC News Online, Sircam virus steals 
files, (July 24, 2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1454155.stm (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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user’s identity to send spam or commit click fraud or to stealing 
profit-generating information like credit card numbers.  The 
Sircam story, however, demonstrates that these forms of 
malware have the capability to breach the privacy of millions of 
infected users in much more serious ways than stealing credit 
card numbers.  The collection of malware-infected computers as 
a whole represents the single largest surveillance device on the 
Internet, capable of collecting and processing the personal data 
of probably hundreds of millions of computers. 
Viruses, too, can collect personal information.  On 
Christmas Day 2007, the SANS Internet Storm Center received 
a report from a user who had found trojan malware on a new 
digital photo frame purchased from a large retailer, Sam’s 
Club.100  Within a week, two more readers of the SANS blog 
reported finding the same virus on other digital photo frames; 
and, within a couple of weeks, readers reported similar viruses 
on a wide array of different consumer devices that acted as USB 
storage devices, including MP3 players, portable hard drives, 
and video cameras.101  The malware found on many of these 
devices was the MocMex trojan horse, a powerful piece of 
malware capable of hiding itself from a variety of anti-virus 
tools.102 
To protect from viruses, bots, worms, and other such 
malware, millions of computer users install anti-virus systems 
on all client computers.  But this anti-virus software is itself 
highly intrusive, operating at the lowest levels of the operating 
system, incurring significant performance penalties, and 
attempting to avoid the notice of malware (which are themselves 
trying to detect the anti-virus systems to disable them).  The 
extensive access given to anti-virus software gives it the 
capability to do the same sorts of harm that a piece of malware 
 
  100 Digital Hitchhikers, available at http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=3787 (Dec. 
25, 2007, 23:24 UTC). 
  101  Digital Hitchhikers, Part Four, available at 
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=3892 (Jan. 28, 2008, 10:37 UTC). 
  102 Deborah Gage, Virus from China the Gift that Keeps on Giving, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE,  Feb. 15, 2008, at C-1, available at  http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/02/15/BU47V0VOH.DTL&type=printable (last visited Nov. 28, 
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can do, including both stealing data from and disabling the host 
computer.  The difference between a legitimate anti-virus tool 
and malware is the trustworthiness of the software distributor.  
Most people trust that Symantec—the provider of a common 
type of anti-virus software—is only using its complete access to 
protect the user’s own computer, while few people trust that a 
malware developer or operator will not abuse its access.   
Internet users have little choice but to trust someone with their 
data. 
4.   Client Surveillance Data Implications 
Client side surveillance provides the most complete access 
to user data.  As such, surveillance techniques by the state that 
either gain access at the client level or obtain data collected by 
others will yield the most detailed picture of the activities of a 
suspect.  It is for this reason, of course, that law enforcement 
officials often seize laptops and turn them over to a computer 
forensics expert to review. 
Virtually every bit of data stored, sent, received, viewed, 
played, or typed on a computer is vulnerable to client-side 
surveillance.  The only data that is potentially not accessible is 
encrypted data that is never accessed during the period of 
surveillance.  Everything else on a computer is available to a 
client surveillance tool. The primary limiting factor is simply 
what the tool developers choose to target with their tools.   
Malware mostly targets various sorts of easily monetized data, 
including email addresses, credit card numbers, bank account 
information and login credentials, and game and other software 
keys.  The most sophisticated anti-virus tools monitor all data 
stored on and transmitted to the computer, checking all data for 
malware signatures, but not keyboard or screen activity.   
Market research tools like comScore typically monitor all 
network traffic, whether encrypted or not, but not stored data or 
keyboard or screen activity.  Workplace and family monitoring 
tools usually monitor keystrokes and sometimes screenshots of 
the minute to minute (or even second to second) activity on the 
computer screen but not stored or network data. 
Client side surveillance tools are often designed not to track 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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certain types of data in order to provide a clearer, more focused 
set of data to the party carrying out the surveillance.  In fact, 
the biggest problem of surveillance on the client side is often 
dealing with the sheer amount of data.  For example, even one 
screenshot a minute on a single computer can generate a 
daunting amount of data.  This problem is magnified when 
applied over a large set of monitored clients.  Botnets (networks 
of malware-infected computers controlled from a single point) 
only search for a limited set of data, like credit card numbers, 
which can easily be monetized, presumably because of the 
difficulty (and, therefore, unprofitability) of sifting through the 
vast trove of other sorts of data on infected computers.   
Likewise, a primary challenge for corporate anti-virus systems 
that must manage entire networks of clients is to manage the 
resulting flood of data. 
Any client side program has at least the potential to access 
every sort of data that resides on or passes through the 
computer.  In fact, even non-surveillance oriented programs 
(screen savers, games, chat programs, and so on) have this 
access to the computer once they have been installed.103  This 
same access applies to most hardware devices installed on the 
computer as well.  Any device that has access to a shared 
channel—such as the USB, PCI, or IDE channels—has the 
ability to monitor all data on that bus directly, and any device 
that requires an operating system driver can use that driver to 
access the breadth of data available on the client computer.   
Even devices that do not directly have the ability to access a 
shared bus or run drivers may have the ability to infect clients 
with malware. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIGITAL DIFFERENCE 
The fact that digital technologies afford this increased level 
of surveillance is not inherently bad.  There are, in fact, many 
 
  103 Most modern operating systems have some level of access control that is intended 
to prevent ordinary programs from having complete access to the data on the computer.  
In practice, it is almost always possible to exploit a vulnerability that breaks through the 
access control system to give the client complete access to the system. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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good reasons to exercise this power.  From the perspective of law 
enforcement, these multiple modes of digital surveillance can 
lead to new and better ways to prevent crimes and to bring 
criminals to justice.  And though the fear of aggregating these 
many sets of data, held in many hands, is true in concept, the 
reality is that it is technically difficult to pull disparate data sets 
together in a way that is helpful for purposes of surveillance.104 
The issue raised by these changes in technologies and their 
usage is whether individual data-sharing practices and the 
safeguards for civil liberties are keeping up with the changes.105  
Of the many things that have changed in the digital era, the 
manner in which surveillance can be carried out by the state is 
high on the list of the more dramatic types of changes.  Compare 
traditional surveillance to Internet-era surveillance and the 
differences become plain.  In traditional surveillance, the law 
enforcement official primarily focuses on known targets and has 
access largely to live communications and imperfect records of 
past interactions.  The data that can be tracked are mostly in 
rivers (such as tapping a phone conversation) rather than in the 
form of oceans (which might later be searched). 
In the digital age, law enforcement officials have many 
more means of surveillance than in the past.  (Of course, there 
are reasons to celebrate this fact in the interests of public 
security.)  Law enforcement officials have the opportunity to 
 
  104  Simson L. Garfinkel, Information of the World, Unite!, SCI. AM., 82-5 Sept. 2008. 
  105  There is interesting literature related to privacy in a digital age and how we might 
reconceptualize it in light of recent changes in technology, which often expands the 
frame of a discussion such as the one here in this paper.  As one example, Julie Cohen 
has recently written an article on the information privacy law project and its intersection 
with the Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, 
and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2008).  In this article, Cohen notes that privacy 
and technology literature focuses on informational privacy, but that spatial privacy is a 
relevant concept often overlooked in recent discourse.  Id. at 183, 189-90.  Cohen 
suggests that the spatial dimension of privacy is important, in light of internet usage, as 
“online conduct and online surveillance are experienced spatially.”  Id. at 194.  When 
online activities are conceptualized as something one does in a “networked space,” this 
“zone of personal space” is a meaningful and useful concept for privacy discourse.  Id. at 
195.  Recognizing that online activities exist in a networked space also suggests that 
individual behavior changes within that space (for better or worse) in response to the 
awareness that one is being surveilled within that space.  Id. at 195-96. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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either focus on a known target or look for patterns across a 
network that might give rise to suspicion.  Both rivers and 
oceans of information are available, depending upon the period 
during which data are retained in any given situation.  Law 
enforcement officials have access to past, stored 
communications, which may or may not have seemed relevant 
during the initial surveillance.  Data could be collected, placed 
in a large database, and later sorted, at much greater speeds 
and at lower costs than ever before.  In addition, past actions 
can be recreated much more effectively based on third-party 
data collected in the course of everyday interactions.  Profiles 
can be sewn together across data sources to create a more 
comprehensive profile of an individual or a pre-determined 
“type” of person. 
The practice of non-targeted Internet surveillance is also 
rendered much easier in the digital era.  A law enforcement 
official might establish a “driftnet” to capture all traffic through 
critical points in the network, much as the NSA is believed to 
have done through the black box in a closet at AT&T.   
Automated filtering and processing of traffic is far cheaper and 
faster than ever before, such that a non-targeted search might 
yield patterns or point to suspicious practices.  This form of 
searching requires less human involvement than in the past.  A 
person is needed for coding the system, setting filters, and 
reviewing results—but not for reviewing everything as it goes 
past.  Such non-targeted surveillance might enable law 
enforcement officials to identify persons matching a predefined 
profile, to identify unusual patterns not predefined, or to record 
networks for unknown, future searching purposes. 
In the digital era, governments also collect and review 
information about individuals for purposes not related to the 
traditional mode of law enforcement.  For instance, government 
officials collect information for the purpose of record-matching 
between different government databases in order to ensure that 
welfare recipients are not perpetrating fraud.106  The United 
 
  106 See Virginia Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship: Surveillance and Political 
Learning in the Welfare System, in S URVEILLANCE AND SECURITY:  TECHNOLOGICAL 
POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 89, (Torin Monihan, ed., 2006).  See also JOHN 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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States Census Bureau collects highly sensitive personal data—
such as income, race, ethnicity, physical handicap, and so 
forth—as part of its American Community Survey from a small 
sample of the population; recipients are told that they are 
“required by law” (Title 13 of the United States Code) to 
respond.107  The handwritten data entered by citizens are then 
keyed into government databases.108 
At the same time, most people are not able to keep up with 
all the changes in the technology that encode these data and 
otherwise enable this surveillance to happen in so many 
different ways.  Through our research with young people, for 
instance, we found they were almost universally surprised to 
learn of the extent to which information was collected about 
them by third parties and the extent to which that information 
could be monitored, stored, and later searched.109  A s  t h e  
possibilities for law enforcement to practice surveillance in 
concert with private third parties grow each year, public 
awareness of these practices is not keeping pace. 
V. THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE, AND THE REASONABLE 
Two primary concerns arise out of this fast-changing state 
of affairs.  The first is about the convergence of the public and 
the private.  The related concern is whether citizens are able to 
make reasonable choices about how they lead lives mediated by 
these technologies and what the consequences of those choices 
might be with respect to what the state can come to know about 
them.110 
 
GILLIOM,  OVERSEERS OF THE POOR:  SURVEILLANCE,  RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF 
PRIVACY (2001). 
  107  Census.gov, ACS Congressional Tool Kit 1, available at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/SBasics/congress_toolkit/ACS%20Tool%20Kit.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2008); see also Census.gov, American Community Survey (ACS), 
available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
  108 See Census.gov, About the Data (Methodology): Data Collection & Processing, 
available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/AdvMeth/CollProc/CollProc1.htm (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
  109 P ALFREY & GASSER, supra note 5, at 39-82. 
  110 There are, to be sure, other fears to which this set of facts might give rise, such as 
the overall suite of powers granted to law enforcement authorities to carry out network 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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A.  Shifting Meanings of Public and Private 
There are two meanings of “public” and “private” that have 
salience in the context of surveillance.  The first is from the 
perspective of the person who is observing someone else.  Is this 
observer a public actor?  And is this public actor relying solely 
upon data collected by him or herself, or instead relying upon 
data collected by private actors?  Second, this distinction 
matters from the perspective of the person who is being 
observed.  The issues involved in each one are different from the 
other. 
1.   The Perspective of the Observer 
The Fourth Amendment regulates the conduct of state 
actors where that conduct might violate an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.111  From the observer’s 
perspective, much turns on whether the actor falls into the 
category of a state actor—for shorthand, here, representing the 
“public”—and whether that state actor carries out the 
surveillance directly.  In this sense, the meaning of the “public” 
makes perfect sense: if the actor is a state actor and is carrying 
out the surveillance directly on a known target, then the 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis follows.  This paper 
does not dwell on this topic since there is a rich body of 
scholarship on the question of when and whether a warrant 
should issue.112 
The issue addressed in this paper focuses on when the 
observer is a public actor and when the relevant data have been 
gathered by a private actor.  The question asked near the 
threshold of a Fourth Amendment analysis does not have to do 
with the data involved or how those data were initially gathered.  
Vastly more data are now gathered through digital means, at 
 
surveillance.  Orin S. Kerr takes up these general issues and debunks several of the 
common myths on this related topic. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the 
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2003). 
  111 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
  112 See,  e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
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the network, server, and client levels.  So long as the collection 
of the data is performed by the private party, and the public 
party obtains the information from this private party, then the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment do not generally attach. 
In practice, United States law affords some protections 
against public scrutiny of data collected by private parties.  In 
many cases, the private party will refuse to give information to a 
law enforcement official without a subpoena or other formal 
order.  Some companies perceive their business model to turn on 
whether they are trusted providers of Internet services, and as 
such make public their resistance to government demands, as 
Google successfully did against a Department of Justice request 
for a large amount of data on search queries; other firms, such 
as AOL, Yahoo!, and Microsoft, complied without a battle in 
court.113 
What is different in an Internet era is that the vast 
majority of useful data about an individual is increasingly held 
in private hands—and individuals have a harder and harder 
time each year avoiding placing the data there in the first place.  
The emphasis in terms of legal protections on whether the 
observer is a public actor who carries out the search directly 
means that the core Constitutional protection is against 
“unreasonable searches.” 
2.   The Perspective of the Observed 
From the perspective of the person who is potentially 
observed—call her the “citizen”—“public” and “private” mean 
something different than what it means from the perspective of 
the person conducting the surveillance.  What matters from the 
citizen’s perspective is whether he or she has a reasonable 
expectation that the activities under surveillance are taking 
place in public or private. 
There are three key problems that derive from this 
perspective in the digital age.  The first is that the activity 
might be taking place in a context that the citizen believes is 
 
  113 Katie Hafner & Matt Richtel, Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of Search Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A1; Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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“private,” but where a third party is recording that activity.  The 
recording might be taking place in a perfectly lawful, consensual 
way.  For instance, the citizen signed up for an Internet Service 
Provider’s package that permits access to the Internet, an email 
account, and a back-up service.  Similarly, as researchers have 
shown, young people in particular consistently perceive their 
online audiences as more (and occasionally less) “private” than 
they really are.114  For instance, they might post information to a 
page that they maintain on a social network site, such as 
MySpace or Facebook, to which only friends have access.  In 
each of these cases, information might be shared in a certain 
context which feels “private” but which is plainly open to 
surveillance of multiple kinds.  Neither the Fourth Amendment 
nor privacy-related statutes would protect the citizen, even if the 
citizen’s perception of the context was “private.” 
Federal courts in the United States have addressed this 
general issue in several matters, but the law remains unsettled.  
In  Warshak v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that 
“individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-
mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a 
commercial ISP.”115  In a demonstration of how shaky the law is 
on this subject, the Warshak opinion was vacated on October 9, 
2007, granting the government a rehearing en banc.116  O n  
rehearing, the constitutional question was avoided, as the court 
asserted that plaintiff’s claim for injunction against future 
government action was not ripe.117  Though the original 
Warshak opinion was vacated, the matter continues to be briefed 
 
  114 danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked 
Publics 
in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA (David Buckingham ed., 
2007),  available at 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/dmal.9780262524834.119 (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2008).  Urs Gasser and I found much the same thing in our focus groups and 
interviews conducted while researching privacy matters for Born Digital. 
  115 Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stating that something an individual “seeks to 
preserve as private” is therefore “constitutionally protected”). 
  116 Warshak, 490 F.3d at 455. 
  117  Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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as of this writing, and scholars have already begun to take up 
the possible implications of such a ruling in depth.118 
State courts have wrestled with this issue as well.  In State 
v. Reid, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under a 
search and seizure provision of the New Jersey Constitution, a 
citizen has a protected privacy interest in information they 
provide to an ISP.119  On the other hand, in State v. Delp, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals held that under Oregon law, the 
defendant did not have a privacy interest in non-content 
information disclosed to an ISP.120 
The second, closely related problem is the difficulty, in a 
digital age, for the citizen to keep anything truly private from 
third parties.  As the citizen’s life is increasingly mediated by 
digital technologies, her social life, her work life, her civic life, 
and any other lives she leads are often led partly in digital 
public spaces.  For those who carry BlackBerries on their hips or 
send text messages constantly, as many young people do, an 
increasing array of information about us is potentially in the 
hands of many people we do not know.  In most cases, we also do 
not know what is being stored, for how long, and when and how 
it might be accessed or sold, by whom or to whom. 
The final problem is that it is very difficult for the citizen to 
keep up with the pace of technological change.  The rate of 
development of new digital technologies is very fast, such that 
even technology experts have little sense of what is even 
commercially available in fields tangentially related to their 
own.  Few people would be knowledgeable enough about digital 
technologies to have an effective sense of what information they 
are sharing is publicly accessible and what is private. 
This problem of keeping up with generally available digital 
technologies is particularly important in the context of the 
 
  118  Tamar R. Gubins, Warshak v. United States: The Katz for Electronic 
Communication, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 723 (2008).  See also ZITTRAIN, supra note 15, 
at 188; Orin Kerr, The Volokh Conspiracy, A Series of Posts on Warshak v. United 
States,  available at http://volokh.com/posts/1182208168.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 
2008). 
  119  State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33-34 (N.J. 2008). 
  120  State v. Delp, 178 P.3d 259, 264 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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Fourth Amendment.  Kyllo v. United States holds an important 
place in the doctrine on Fourth Amendment law with respect to 
new technologies.121  I n  Kyllo, the Court held that the use of 
technology to obtain any “information regarding the home’s 
interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, 
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use.”122  The last part of the 
Kyllo test is particularly important given the topic of this paper.  
The “general public use” test is vague and hard to implement.  A 
search conducted with technologies that would seem to be in 
“general public use” may not be well known to a large 
percentage of a given population.  Therefore, the use of new 
information technologies to conduct a search may not merit 
Fourth Amendment protection, even when the person being 
observed might expect the information to be protected. 
B. Protecting What is “Reasonable” 
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard is tricky 
even for law professors to understand.  It is the most debated, 
puzzling aspect of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and 
scholarship.123  For ordinary people, it is only getting more 
difficult—in a technological age—to develop a sense of what is 
reasonable.  The range of possible surveillance methods at the 
network, server, and client levels underscore this difficulty 
facing citizens.  Moreover, citizens face a dual bind: they need to 
decide whom to trust with their data (often private parties), but 
they also have to wonder—at the point of giving up control over 
their data—about who else might later access those data (often 
public entities). 
As more and more of our lives are subject to these various 
forms of surveillance over “public” networks, it is crucial that 
some of our basic communications are treated as “private” under 
law.  Some lower courts, in interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 
 
  121  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
  122 Id. at 28. 
  123 Kerr,  Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 16, at 504. 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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have suggested that sometimes actions in a public place, if 
meant to be private, might give rise to Constitutional protection.  
As one court held, “what a person knowingly exposes to the 
public through an open door or window does not receive Fourth 
Amendment protection, yet what a person tries to keep private, 
even in a public place, may be entitled to constitutional 
protection.”124  But the question of when data in public places 
online, if ever, give rise to such protections has not been made 
clear. 
When it comes to the third-party data problem, though, 
there is little risk of misinterpreting the Supreme Court’s 
current position.  In 1976, the Court made plain that citizens 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in data given by them 
to third parties in United States v. Miller.125  Courts have long 
held that even evidence unlawfully obtained by a private party 
may later be used by a state actor against a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding.126  The Fourth Amendment is usually 
implicated if a state actor participates in a search by a private 
party, or requests that a private party initiate the search, but 
that is not ordinarily the case in network, server, or client 
surveillance on the Internet.127  Courts have held that a 
government search which occurs after a completed private 
search is lawful without a warrant if it does not exceed the scope 
of the private search.128  The risk of government review of those 
data falls on the part of the person who deposited that 
information.129 
In 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court elaborated on the 
 
  124  United States. v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2003). 
  125  425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). 
  126  Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921). 
  127 See generally 1 WAYNE  R.  LAFAVE,  SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A  TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8(b) (4th ed. 2004) (detailing that the exclusionary rule applies 
to private searches or non-police searches where the government has requested the 
search, or has become involved with the search either at the beginning or at any time 
before the search is concluded). 
  128 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (noting that governmental 
actions pursuant to a private search of an individual’s property or possessions “must be 
tested by the degree to which they exceed the scope of the private search”). 
  129  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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treatment of data given by an individual to a private third 
party.130  The Court held that citizens have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy for the phone numbers they dial, because 
they voluntarily expose this information to their phone 
companies.131  As a result, the Fourth Amendment protections 
did not attach in a case in which the government asked a phone 
company to install a pen register on a suspect’s phone line.132  
This third-party doctrine becomes increasingly problematic as 
technology, and usage of it, evolves.  While Smith may have had 
relatively narrow implications when originally decided, its 
holding might have much broader applicability in an Internet 
era since individuals knowingly give data to third parties when 
they send emails and other everyday digitally-mediated 
communications.133  In spite of rapid technological change, 
Smith and Miller remain good law for the most part, though in 
some instances state courts have refused to define the Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections so narrowly, thus declining to 
follow the two cases on state law grounds.134 
Much could have turned on the original holding in 
Warshak, if it were to become law.  In the vacated Warshak 
opinion, the court noted a distinction between voluntarily 
submitting certain information to a third party, and exposing 
information to an “intermediary that merely has the ability to 
access the information sought by the government.”135  T h i s  
distinction, if recognized by other courts, would conceivably 
disassociate the third-party doctrine developed in Smith  and 
 
  130  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
  131 Id. at 742. 
  132 Id. at 745-46. 
  133 Ric  Simmons,  From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth 
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS  L.J. 1303, 1338-39 
(2002). 
  134 See,  e.g., State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash. 1986) (holding that under the 
Washington Constitution, a citizen has a privacy interest in their phone records and 
thus a search warrant is necessary for the installation of a pen register); State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991) (holding that bank customers have a right of 
privacy in their bank records under the state constitution). See also generally Francis A. 
Gilligan & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Cyberspace: The Newest Challenge for Traditional 
Legal Doctrine, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 305, 330 (1998). 
  135  Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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Miller from Fourth Amendment issues regarding Internet usage.  
But absent a clear opinion of this sort, the third-party data issue 
continues to loom over commonplace activities by citizens over 
digital networks. 
VI. TAKING UP THE “MOMENTOUS ISSUES” 
Though technology may help safeguard personally 
identifiable information to some extent in a digital age, the 
answer is not likely that privacy can be enhanced through 
technology alone.  The market can help, too, as firms compete to 
earn user trust, but it provides an imperfect solution at best.  In 
addition, straight legal reform is unlikely to offer a complete 
answer.  The amount of information about each person is 
growing and the ability to access it is likewise increasing.   
United States citizens are putting information about their lives 
into myriad public systems willingly. 
Two proposals might help protect citizens in a digital era 
without unduly hampering the ability of law enforcement official 
to perform their job.  First, courts might recognize 
circumstances in which citizens demonstrate an intent to keep 
data private when considering the extent to which those 
communications are deemed to be protected under law.  Second, 
through legislation, states might extend a right to demand 
deletion to citizens to enable them to prompt the destruction 
after the fact of certain personally identifiable information held 
in private hands. 
Courts might begin by recognizing a sliding scale that 
enables one to distinguish between those transactions, whether 
involved with public or private parties, that use digital 
networked technologies that give rise to some legal protection 
from government surveillance and those that do not.  Imagine 
that a citizen sends an unencrypted email from her account with 
a commercial ISP, such as Verizon, to a friend, who uses 
Comcast as her ISP.  The citizen believes that this email was 
“private.”  But plainly, in terms of both government and 
corporate ability to access it, that message is not “private.”  The 
email is recorded by her ISP; it is conveyed much as a postcard 
would be, across an open network; and it is recorded by her 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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friend’s ISP.  This communication is one in which the public 
actor would have little trouble gaining access and for which the 
law might offer, as today, little or no protection. 
Especially if absent the protections that a Warshak-style 
holding might afford, a citizen ought to be able to manifest her 
intent to keep certain data communications private in a way the 
law might be able to recognize in various ways.136  For instance, 
if that same email is encrypted from end-to-end, which is not 
technically difficult after setting up a basic system of 
communication, the message in every form—even when 
unencrypted, in plain text, and having traveled over public 
networks—might be deemed to have certain protections under 
law as “private” data.  If that email was collected at a client on 
either end of the transaction, that data would receive additional 
protection under law.  Likewise, an e-commerce transaction in 
which the citizen took steps to use a pseudonym or, more 
advanced, a zero-knowledge proof to identify herself only to a 
merchant (but not to someone intercepting the data) might be 
deemed to be “private”—as might the credit card information 
and other details of the transaction.137  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  i f  a  
citizen expresses her intent for a certain transaction to be 
 
  136 It is of course the case that there are certain statutory protections for personal 
data under United States law, such as the 1974 Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a).  In 
particular, the Privacy Act requires that federal agencies use personal data only for its 
intended purpose.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(e)(1), (3)(B) (2008). In practice, however, the 
effect of this statute in terms of citizen protection has been modest.  There are additional 
statutory limitations to sharing information between private parties and the 
government.  For a specific example, see the 1986 Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11, under the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 
which provides limitations to the sharing of information between an electronic 
communications service and a law enforcement agency.  Under the SCA, a provider may 
only voluntarily disclose the contents of a communication to a law enforcement agency 
where (1) the service provider inadvertently obtained the information and (2) the 
information appears to pertain to criminal activity.  18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7)(A)(i)-(ii) 
(2008).  Alternatively, a governmental entity may require that a provider disclose certain 
electronic communication information, but in most instances a warrant is necessary.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2008).  The European Commission has similarly struggled with these 
issues, and has sought to place strong, comprehensive protections for citizens. 
  137 See Anna Lysyanskaya, Cryptography: How to Keep Your Secrets Safe, SCI. AM., 
Sept. 2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=cryptography-how-to-keep-
your-secrets-safe (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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private, using either proprietary or widely accessible technical 
means, the law could meet her part way.  The obvious 
shortcomings of this intent-based approach include the 
subjective nature of intent generally and the extent to which an 
encrypted email (one related to which the intent has been 
manifested) is less likely to be subject to surveillance by the very 
nature of its protection. 
Second, the law might also be amended to help a citizen 
demand that information about him or her held by private firms 
be taken out of the “public” space after the fact.  Since one of the 
fears about government surveillance is the ability to search in 
oceans of data, held in private hands after the fact, a citizen 
might be permitted by law to demand that her account not only 
be closed, but all data associated with her name be deleted by 
the technology service provider.138  Such a “right to demand 
deletion” would have demerits, to be sure.139  The costs 
 
  138 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 10 
(2005),  available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/dec05/ohm.pdf, 
responding to Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531 (2005) (for discussion of such a right that might be embedded in Fourth Amendment 
protections).   See also Paul Ohm, The Olmsteadian Seizure Clause: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Seizure of Intangible Property, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 (2008). 
  139 Paul Schwartz alludes to an idea similar to the right to demand deletion in his 
discussion of privacy-control in the internet age.  Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and 
the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000).  Schwartz notes that in light of rising privacy 
concerns due to rapid technological change, there is agreement that privacy means 
individuals should have the right to control the use of the data they disperse over the 
internet.  Id.  at 820.  This is what he terms the “privacy-control” paradigm.  Id.  
However, Schwartz ultimately rejects the privacy-control paradigm, noting that given 
collective action problems, bounded rationality, and informational asymmetries, 
informational self-determination is not a realistic goal.  Id. at 822.  He additionally notes 
that given public accountability and bureaucratic rationality considerations, it is not 
clear that privacy concerns trump other needs requiring that this information not be 
secluded from the public realm. Id. at 828.  Though Schwartz critiques privacy-control, 
the alternative he proposes still assigns value to the idea that individuals should have 
some control over the information they disperse on the internet, but that this right is not 
absolute.  Id.  at 834.  Thus Schwartz champions constitutive privacy, claiming that 
“information privacy norms should create shifting, multidimensional data preserves that 
insulate personal data from different kinds of observation by different parties.  Different 
kinds of  ‘outing,’ that is, revelation of otherwise fully or partially hidden aspects of one’s 
life, should be prevented before different audiences.” Id. at 834-35. 
   Lior Jacob Strahilevitz discusses generally a “right to destroy,” but he does not 
discuss it in the context of the Fourth Amendment or privacy rights.  Lior Jacob 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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associated with implementing such a system would be high for 
the private sector; law enforcement officials would inevitably 
lose access to potentially very useful information about 
criminals who invoke the law to protect evidence of their 
wrongdoing; and some companies might be prompted to 
aggregate more personal information with someone’s identity in 
order to be able to comply with deletion orders.  Any legislative 
fix of this sort would need to be drafted carefully to mitigate 
these potential harms.140 
Other legislative steps might make sense over time, 
especially to the extent that the third-party data problem grows 
as reliance on digitally mediated technologies, using private 
services, grows.141  A further legislative rule might be enacted to 
stop certain government means of accessing personally 
identifiable data held in private hands, such as the purchase of 
data from data brokers.  Likewise, rules might limit the uses to 
which such aggregated data are put by government actors, such 
as limits on sharing data across agencies for purposes other 
than that for which the data was initially collected.  A tort-based 
regime might help to regulate the sharing or disclosure of 
information across the public-private border to the extent that 
rigorous procedures are not honored during the transfer.142  And 
 
Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).  Rather, Strahilevitz refers 
to the right to destroy as a property right—one of the “sticks in the bundle of [property] 
rights.”  Id. at 794.  Ohm and Strahilevitz accept a right to destroy/delete as pre-existing, 
and the conclusion follows that if such a right is a defined property interest, then the 
Fourth Amendment is implicated when the government interferes with an individual’s 
right to delete. 
  140 There is a closely analogous right to disclosure and correction included in the EU 
privacy rights and in U.S. safe harbor definition related to the EU Privacy Directive. 
  141 Fred Cate, for instance, proposes a selection of statutory protections to fill the gap 
in privacy protections affected by the Smith and Miller decisions in the internet age.  
Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008).  Cate proposes (among other things) the authorization of 
data mining programs that promote accountability, oversight, and compliance with legal 
requirements.  Id. at 487.  He suggests that such programs should be strictly limited, 
both in terms of who can use data mining systems, and in terms of the quantity and 
quality of information revealed.  Id. 
  142 One critique of the current law/tort-regime is that there is usually no suppression 
remedy in this sort of legal action.  Though the ECPA may regulate government access to 
electronic communication information collected by a third party, Fourth Amendment 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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still others have argued that the problems of informational 
privacy in a digital age are best solved through the courts.143 
The market, too, might help citizens, though the limits of a 
purely market-based solution are quickly evident.  Some firms 
do compete on the basis of establishing “best practices” for 
protecting consumer data; Google signaled their leadership on 
privacy in resisting the Department of Justice’s demand for 
search data.  In the international context, a series of technology 
companies is working on a code of conduct to govern when they 
will turn data over to state actors.144  Best practices for 
businesses and easy-to-understand icons for citizens might 
provide a greater sense to citizens of the risks that they run by 
using certain services.  These icons might make clear, for 
instance, how long data collected by a certain firm are retained 
and how the company responds to government requests for 
information.  But citizens would need to be savvy enough to 
interpret the relevant market signals.  And the core third-party 
data problem—the government’s ability to access these data 
held in “public” places—would be little changed.  If we leave it to 
the market alone, no meaningful legal barrier would be erected 
between the private sector players and the public agencies. 
 
remedies are not available for victims of an ECPA violation.  Though government 
entities are liable to suit under the ECPA, it has been held that the statute does not 
afford a suppression remedy.  See Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000). 
  143 Ric Simmons, for instance, asserts that in Katz, the court delineated a results-
based test rather than a method-based rule for decision in Fourth Amendment cases.  
Simmons, supra note 134.  According to Simmons, the Katz court intended that Fourth 
Amendment protections attach to particular kinds of information collected, as opposed to 
particular search methods used.  Id.  In decisions like Smith, courts have strayed from 
the  Katz results-based test and adopted more of a methods-based test.  If the court 
returns to a results-based test, it is plausible to expect that Fourth Amendment 
protections attach to information dispersed over the Internet that an individual has 
intended to keep private. 
  144 See http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/principles; see also Jonathan Zittrain & 
John Palfrey, Reluctant Gatekeepers: Corporate Ethics on a Filtered Internet, in ACCESS 
DENIED:  THE  PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL  INTERNET  FILTERING 103-22 (Ronald 
Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohizinski, & Jonathan Zittrain eds., 2008). 02_PALFREY 12/27/2008  9:04:48 PM 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, we as citizens need to decide how much access 
to the increasingly rich records of our lives we want to grant our 
law enforcement officials.  At present, in practice, we as citizens 
would need to limit what we turn over to private parties if we 
wish to limit what the state can come to know about us.  As the 
court said in Garcia, “Whether and what kind of restrictions 
should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such 
surveillance when used in routine criminal enforcement are 
momentous issues. . . .”145  These momentous issues play out at 
the United States border with cyberspace, and at international 
borders, many times every day. 
Given what we know about how people are leading their 
lives mediated by digital technologies, and given what we know 
about how much surveillance can happen in converged public 
and private spaces online, it is time that we take up these issues 
directly and re-evaluate the inevitable trade-offs we are making 
every day.  Central to the challenge that we face is an 
information asymmetry: while we have an all-too-graphic idea of 
the high costs of not ensuring our security today, we know too 
little about what others will be able to come to know about us in 
the future.  What we do know is that the third-party data 
problem grows with each passing year.  We know that private 
entities collect much data about us.  We know that the law 
affords citizens little protection from abuse by either public or 
private parties.  And we know that the rules that we set today to 
govern the collection, sharing, and access of data will have long-
term consequences, both for security and for individual privacy.  
Based upon these facts, it is time to rethink whether the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment is sufficient to protect individual privacy 
from intrusion by the state, especially with respect to data 
initially collected by private parties.  More fundamentally, it is 
also time to consider whether the public-private distinction, as it 
has developed over the past century and a half, makes sense in a 
digital age. 
 
 
  145  United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 